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ANTITRUST LAW
SMALL MERGER BARRED IN CONCENTRATED INDUSTRY
Stanley Works v. FTC
Section 7 of the Clayton Act1 prohibits mergers which "may" have
substantial anticompetitive effects. This Act is by no means a precise
and simplified measure to be applied to the diverse and complex con-
siderations inherent in evaluating a merger.2 Only those mergers exhib-
iting a "reasonable probability"3 of competitive injury are proscribed. 4
While the usual and most feared anticompetitive situation is the cumu-
lative, step-by-step concentrating trend within an industry, it is clear
that Congress also saw the dangers in the single merger within an already
1 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970). Section 7 provides:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole
or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to the
jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any
part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any
ine of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may
be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly (emphasis
added).
2 Handler 9: Robinson, A Decade of Administration of the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger
Act, 61 CoLum. L. Ray. 629 (1961).
As might be anticipated from the wide variety of industries and the dissimilar
competitive settings in which mergers arise, a seriatim analysis of the decisions
yields no golden thread that foreshadows the outcome of the next case to come
along. The methodology has been to weigh all facts of record and to rest the ad-
judication on their totality. No one item of evidence has been dispositive. Indeed,
a factor that may be deemed significant in one litigation may have little probative
value in another. Far from making for inconsistent application of the law, this
points up the diversity of the competitive conditions that must be reckoned with.
Id. at 675 (footnotes omitted).
8 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 596 (1957). Certitude
of such effects need not be proven. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp.
576, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
Application of the guideline of "reasonable probability" is generally not susceptible
to direct proof, therefore, inferences drawn from economic analysis are necessary. Barnes,
Competitive Mores and Legal Tests in Merger Cases: The Du Pont General Motors Deci-
sion, 46 Gao. LJ. 564, 588 (1958).
4 Despite its concern for the concentration of industries throughout the United States,
Congress has not chosen to outlaw mergers per se. Rather, an incipiency test has been
established to determine which mergers are anticompetitive. When a particular market
is deemed to be concentrated, the incipiency principle "requires not merely an appraisal
of the immediate impact of the merger upon competition, but a prediction of its impact
upon competitive conditions in the future.. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank,
374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963). Implicit in this scheme is the recognition that some mergers do
not harm the competitive structure of the industry; in fact, some may have a beneficial
influence. The prospect of merger may provide an effective escape route upon liquidation,
encourage entry among those incapable of a de novo entry, and generally promote effi-
ciency. Markham, Merger Policy Under the New Section 7: A Six-Year Appraisal, 43 VA.
L. Rav. 489, 493 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Markham]. Furthermore, entry by merger may
have a catalytic effect, promoting economic and competitive life where there formerly had
been an inactive oligopoly. Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and § 7 of the Clayton Act, 78
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concentrated structure.5 In Stanley Works v. FTC,6 the Second Circuit,
with some difficulty, found that the acquisition of Amerock Corporation
by Stanley Works "may" substantially lessen competition, and therefore
affirmed the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) decision ordering di-
vestiture.7
In 1966, Stanley Works, a multi-product corporation, merged with
the Amerock Corporation, a firm engaged in manufacturing cabinet
hardware. Since Stanley also manufactured cabinet hardware, the FTC
considered this merger violative of the antitrust laws. In order to facili-
tate the litigation, the parties made certain stipulations. These proved
to be critical in determining whether the anticompetitive effect was
imbued with the requisite substantiality. 8 Pursuant to stipulation, the
product market was cabinet hardware9 and the relevant geographic
HAv. L. REv. 1313, 1317 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Turner], See also Bowman, Contrasts
in Antitrust Theory: II, 65 CoLuM. L. RE.. 417 (1965).
5 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949); S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1950); Stigler, Mergers and Preventive Antitrust Policy, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 176
(1955). One authority has synthesized the legislative purpose as follows:
Both Senate and House committee reports on the proposed amendment to section
7 make it clear that the objective of the amendment was to prevent further con-
centration in industry. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary put it this way:
"The purpose of the proposed bill ... is to limit future increases in the level of
economic concentration resulting from corporate mergers and acquisitions." The
House Committee on the Judiciary considered the problem in greater detail.
It recognized that the "level of economic concentration in the American economy
is high." It alleged that "the long-term trend of concentration has been steadily
upward.... This long-term rise in concentration is due in considerable part to
the external expansion of business through mergers, acquisitions, and consolida-
tions."
Stocking, The Attorney General's Committee's Report: The Businessman's Guide Through
Antitrust, 44 GEo. L.J. 1, 17 (1955) (footnotes omitted).
6 469 F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1972). The complaint also alleged violations of § 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970), which outlaws unfair methods
of competition and unfair or deceptive practices. Although the converse is not true, a
violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act is ipso facto a violation of § 5 of the FTC Act. 469 F.2d
at 499 n.2; see FTC v. Sperry Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 246 (1972). Accordingly, the
court did not consider the § 5 violation separately.
7 469 F.2d at 499. This appeal was taken directly to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
pursuant to the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1970).
8 The majority refused to go beyond the stipulations of markets and shares nor con-
sider the submarket possibility. Despite strong indicia of insubstantial "cross-elasticity,"
i.e., product interchangeability, the litigants were held to the stipulations. Nor did the
court conjecture as to whether the outcome would have been different had there been
residential and institutional submarkets within the cabinet hardware industry. 469 F.2d
at 500 n.5. But see Judge Mansfield's dissent, which contended that actual competitive
injury could only be determined by examining the actual competitive overlap, and that
the stipulations should not be a bar to this inquiry. Id. at 511.
9 469 F.2d at 500. Cabinet hardware includes "pulls, knobs, hinges, latches, catches and
similar products, including drawer slides and shelving hardware, used principally in
kitchen cabinets." Id. The majority viewed the cabinet hardware industry as a single
market composed of two related lines, institutional and residential cabinet hardware. The
court characterized this division as "descriptive not analytic." Id. at 500 n.5.
In contradistinction, Judge Mansfield felt that the differences between residential and
[Vol. 48:229
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market was nationwide.10 Total national sales of cabinet hardware in
1965 were $80,000,000. Stanley ranked tenth with $814,000 in sales,
a 1 percent market share, while Amerock was the industry leader with
over $18,000,000 in sales, or 22-24 percent of the market." In addition
to these stipulations, the court in Stanley relied on the trial examiner's
factual determination that the industry was concentrated. 2
institutional hardware were significant enough to warrant separate consideration. He noted
that residential hardware is highly stylized and requires a die-casting manufacturing process,
while the institutional type is functional and is simpler to manufacture. Applying this
distinction to the sales figures the dissent established that 75 percent of Stanley's sales
consisted of institutional hardware, while residential hardware comprised 90 percent of
Amerock's total sales. The approximate dollar volume was as follows:
Total Sales Residential Architectural
Stanley 814,000 200,000 614,000
Amerock 18,218,474 18,018,474 200,000
Id. at 512 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
10 469 F.2d at 500. Generally, it behooves the defendant to insure that the markets,
both product and geographic, are drawn along very broad lines. Clearly, the larger the
market under consideration, the smaller the defendant's share appears. However, while
both Amerock and Stanley did sell their materials nationally, there were significant differ-
ences in the nature of their operations. Due to variance in product type, see note 9 supra,
and channels of distribution, 469 F.2d at 513, Stanley, because of its relatively small position
in residential hardware, would have benefitted if the court had considered a narrowly-
drawn market.
11 These figures were also agreed to by stipulation, 469 F.2d at 501 n.6.
12 469 F.2d at 501. Much has been written on the criteria for a finding of concentra-
tion. In Stanle the ten leading firms were as follows:
1965
Cabinet
Hardware Approximate
Sales Total % of
in U.S. Assets Market
1. Amerock Corp. $18,218,474 25,133,914 22.7
2. National Lock Company $11,499,445 87,992,215 14.3
S. Ajax Hardware Corp. $ 6,798,000 3,338,412 8.4
4. Knape & Vogt Mfg. Co. $ 6,013,304 7,968,450 7.5
5. Jaybee Mfg. Corp. $ 3,056,673 1,710,989 3.8
6. Grant Pulley & Hardware Corp. $ 2,168,397 2,369,165 2.7
7. David Allison Co., Inc. $ 1,500,000 1,500,000 1.8
8. Tassell Industries, Inc. $ 1,408,600 2,483,424 1.7
9. Hyer Hardware Mfg. Corp. $ 1,344,464 524,452 1.6
10. Stanley Hardware Division $ 814,000 125,926,000 1.0
Id. at 501 n.7. The approximate percentages have been supplied. The instant structure
would be characterized by Professors Kaysen and Turner as a tight oligopoly, i.e., "a very
small number (eight or fewer) firms supplying 50 percent of the market, with the largest
firm having a 20 percent or higher share [Amerock had 22-24 percent], and with or without
a fringe of small suppliers." C. KAYsEN & D. Tunrmt, AiN'nusr Pouicy, AN ECONOMiC AND
LEGAL ANALYSIs 72 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Armusr Pouicy]. The Justice Department's
Merger Guidelines characterize the cabinet hardware market, where the four leading firms
have less than 75 percent of the market, as "less highly concentrated." I TMA.n REG. P'.
4510, at 6884 (FTC 1971). Additional treatment of when concentration is deemed anticom-
petitive is found in antitrust decisional law. See, eg., FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 Us.
568 (1967) (leading firm controlled 48.8 percent of the market; the top two sellers collectively
had 64.5 percent); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 884 U.S. 270 (1966) (in addition to
1973]
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The Administrative Procedure Act (APA)13 requires an agency to
reveal to the defendant the basis of its adjudication. Furthermore, by
virtue of the Supreme Court's mandate in SEC v. Chenery Corp.,'4 the
defendant must have notice of the theory asserted and a court reviewing
an administrative decision is restricted to the rationale that was em-
ployed by the agency. The petitioner in Stanley contended that the
FTC's finding of illegality was premised solely on the theory of elimina-
tion of potential competition.15 Prior to considering the merits, the
24.4 percent of the market being controlled by four firms, with the top eight controlling
40.9 percent, a rapid trend toward concentration was present); United States v. Pabst
Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966) (tri-state beer market - eight sellers controlled 67.65 per-
cent; national beer market - ten brewers controlled 52.6 percent; United States v. Conti-
nental Can Co., 378 US. 441 (1964) (metal container industry - 71 percent of the market
controlled by two firms; glass container market - three firms controlled 55.4 percent); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964) (two firms controlled 50 percent
of the market, nine controlled 95.7 percent). Frequently, a finding of concentration de-
pends on where attention is focused. In the instant case, the Commission stressed that the
top four firms comprised 49-51 percent of the market. A further breakdown of the figures
above reveals: the top two firms had approximately 37 percent, while the third and fourth
firms collectively had an estimated additional 16 percent. The fifth through tenth ranking
firms accounted only for a further 12.6 percent. Such a breakdown reveals not only that
65 percent of the market was controlled by less than 25 percent of the top firms, but it
also highlights the further significance of the big four with approximately 51 percent, and
the "big two," including Amerock, with a 37 percent share.
13 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1970).
14 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
'5469 F.2d at 501. The complaint had explicitly alleged both actual and potential
theories of illegality. Stanley Works, [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] 3 TRADE REc. REP.
19,646, at 21,692 (FTC 1971). The Commission characterized the action as presenting a
"mingling of the effects which are traditionally cognizable under the discrete categories of
actual and potential competition." Id. at 21,697. Furthermore, the Commission concluded
that "Stanley can be regarded both as an actual and potential competitor in the stipulated
market. The precise label attached to its status is of little importance." Id. While these
few statements, and the frequent mention of present concentration of the market, on their
faces, stress inclusion of the theory of actual competitive injury, the thrust of the opinion
is dominated by analysis of "management" determinations to enter the market through
acquisition, and of the entry barriers. The Commission opinion itself summed up the
examiner's findings as follows:
[t]he examiner found that respondent's [Stanley's] acquisition of Amerock lessened
competition because (1) absent the merger Stanley would probably have entered
the cabinet hardware market on its own ... ; (2) the elimination of Stanley as a
potential competitor had the effect of increasing the barriers to entry .... ; (3)
Stanley, as a potential competitor, had an influence on the performance of the
cabinet hardware market.
Id. at 21,693 (emphasis added).
Two other contentions were advanced by Stanley. The first dealt with the reliance by
the FTC on the "toe-hold theory," which considered whether Stanley could have entered
the market by merging with a much smaller firm. Since the hearing examiner had not
considered the "toe-hold theory" of potential competition, Stanley claimed that it would
be a denial of due process for the FTC to rely on this theory in its decision. Although the
Commission did find some support in the "toe-hold theory," Stanley Works, [1970-1973
Transfer Binder] 3 TRADE REG. REP. 19,646, at 21,701 (FTC 1971), the Second Circuit
agreed with Stanley that the Commission's consideration was improper. However, since the
court was limiting its view to actual competition, the error was not deemed prejudicial.
469 F.2d at 508 n. 24. Additionally, Stanley claimed that it was denied a fair hearing be-
[Vol. 48:229
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court acknowledged that the Commission had relied upon theories of
both actual and potential competitive injury.16 However, Judge Kauf-
man, writing for the majority, concluded that the record "establishes
clearly" that the actual competition theory was the basis of the FTC's
decision and that any doubts were "convincingly dispelled" by a careful
reading of the Commission's opinion.17 Accordingly, the court limited
its review to the elements of actual competitive injury s.8
Unfortunately, the court has taken the problem too lightly. By
pointing to a few specific instances of the use of the word "actual," it
was satisfied that the Commission had relied on the actual theory, and
that Stanley had notice of it.19 Despite the majority's conclusion, this
was obviously not so clear and understandable either to Stanley" or
dissenting Judge Mansfield.21 In light of this conflict, a serious question
arises as to whether the Stanley majority complied with the spirit of
Chenery. Primarily, Chenery requires the court to decide the merits
"solely by the grounds invoked by the agency." 22 Although the agency
is not required to crystallize the basis of its decision, the reviewing
court should not be forced to struggle through ambiguity and inconsis-
tency to ascertain an acceptable rationale. Instead, Chenery qualifies
the reviewing court's task by reciting this important corollary:
If the administrative action is to be tested by the basis upon which
it purports to rest, that basis must be set forth with such clarity as
to be understandable. It will not do for a court to be compelled
to guess at the theory underlying the agency's action; nor can a
cause the Commission had prejudged the facts. The court found this contention to be
"without merit." Id.
16 469 F.2d at 501.
'7 Id. at 502-03.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Stanley's brief to the court was barren of argument on the theory of actual com-
petition. In the "Introduction to its Argument," Stanley stated:
While the Commission's analysis of the case is somewhat difficult to follow, it is
evident that the fundamental theory of illegality on which its decision is based is
that the merger with Amerock eliminated Stanley as a potential significant com-
petitor in the relevant cabinet hardware market. The entire thrust of its opinion
is directed at supporting the proposition that (a) but for the merger Stanley might
have entered the market on a significant scale, either by internal development or
by "toe-hold" acquisition, and (b) the elimination of Stanley as a potential entrant
into that market had competitive significance.
Brief for Petitioner at 19 (emphasis added). In its reply brief, Stanley, having become
aware that the Commission was proceeding on the theory of actual competitive injury,
directed its argument to the de minimis nature of its merger. This argument, as the court
points out, had been raised earlier, but was dropped when it appeared the Commission
was limiting its grounds to the loss of a potential competitor. Reply Brief for Petitioner
at 5 n.4.
21469 F.2d at 509-10 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
22 332 U.S. at 196.
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court be expected to chisel that which must be precise from what
the agency has left vague and indecisive.23
If Chenery is to afford protection against unwarranted judicial affir-
mance of agency determinations its spirit as well as its letter should be
followed. The Second Circuit found no difficulty in finding an "actual
theory" in an agency opinion dominated by the potential concept, thus
deeming itself to have complied with Chenery. It is doubtful, however,
that Chenery was satisfied.24
Having disposed of the Chenery question, the court turned to the
merits. The opinion revolved around two major concepts: (1) whether,
by virtue of Stanley's 1 percent share of the market, the merger would
substantially affect competition; (2) whether Stanley's entrance into the
market by merger rather than on its own violated the incipiency stan-
dard of the Clayton Act.
In order to evaluate the effect on competition, Judge Kaufman
focused on the degree of concentration in the industry.2 5 The mere fact
that an industry is concentrated, does not preclude all mergers. To
establish a violation of section 7 substantial competitive injury must be
shown. However, where an industry is concentrated the competitive
injury is more likely to be substantial. Traditionally, courts have in-
validated mergers where the industry exhibits both characteristics of
23 Id. at 196-97 (emphasis added). Simply stated, the courts cannot adopt a post hoc
rationale for agency action. Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156,
168 (1962). Accord, Bendix Corp. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 534 (6th Cir. 1971). See also Rodale
Press, Inc. v. FTC, 407 F.2d 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Douds v. Int'l Longshoreman's Ass'n,
241 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1957).
24 See 469 F.2d at 509-10 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). It is submitted that the incipiency
standard of the Clayton Act, see note 3 supra, should bear the responsibility for this
dilemma. The very fact that the incipiency standard requires "a prediction of [a merger's]
impact upon competitive conditions in the future," United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963), necessitates a consideration of potential anticompetitive
effect. Thus, even if the Commission's decision is grounded on actual effect, some con-
sideration of potential effect is unavoidable. Moreover, the intermingling of potential and
actual theories increases where the subject market is more concentrated.
25 469 F.2d at 504. See note 12 supra. However, concentration itself is not a violation
of the Clayton Act. There still must be a finding that the particular merger challenged
will probably result in an anticompetitive effect. Handler, Some Unresolved Problems of
Antitrust, 62 COLUM. L. Rav. 930 (1962).
Although a merger reduces the number of competing companies by one, although
it increases concentration pro tanto, although it confers an economic advantage,
or even if it forecloses competitors from one outlet or source of supply while a
sufficient number of others remain available - why should it be inhibited if
competition is not likely to be substantially lessened in the appropriate market?
Id. at 947 (footnotes omitted). To be condemned, the concentration must exhibit anti-
competitive effects. "This is a truism which is frequently overlooked." Id. at 951. See also
Turner, supra note 4, at 1395.
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oligopoly and a discernible trend toward further concentration, 2 At
the time of the merger in Stanley, there were some fifty to Afty-five firms
competing in the industry,27 with approximately half the market share
being controlled by the "big four,"28 Relying principally upon United
States v. Pabst Brewing Co.,29 and United States v. Aluminum C9, of
America,39 the court emphasized that when a market is controlled by
so few sellers, the small but important competitors should be preserved.
While both decisions involved a greater percentage of market share
than Stanley's 1 percent, they do suggest that such a share is not assumed
to be de minimis.31 In the instant case Stanley's merger with Amerock
would add 1 percent to the dominant forces and, more importantly, to
the leading firm. While bare statistics are not dispositive of the question,
frequently they are suggestive of the outcome. In fact, several authori-
ties have urged that such percentage shares be presumptive of an anti-
competitive effect.3 2
20 See, e.g., United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 550-51 (1966) (national
market - number of breweries decreased from 714 in 1934, to 229 in 1961; state of Wisconsin
- number decreased from 77 in 1955 to 54 in 1961; in the tri-stat6 area - the number
decreased from 104 in 1957 to 86 in 1961); United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S.
441, 445 (1964) (Continental had acquired 21 metal container companies since 1913);
United States v. Philadelphia NatI Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 331 (1963) (number of commercial
banks had decreased from 108 in 1947 to 42 by the time of the suit).
27 469 F.2d at 504. Subsequent to the merger, the number of firms in the industry
increased to approximately 97. Id. at 514. In light of the vitality this fact illustrates, and
in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it is dear that no trend toward further
concentration was present in Stanley.
2$ See note 12 supra. The four leading firms, controlling approximately 50 percent of
the market were Amerock Corp., National Lock Co., Ajax Hardware Corp., and Knape .:
Vogt ffg Co.
29 384 US. 546 (1966). The beer industry involved was viewed in several distinct geo-
graphic markets. In the national market Pabst was tenth, and Blatz ranked eighteenth.
The resulting merger produced the fifth largest national brewer with 4.49 percent. In the
state of Wisconsin, Blatz was the leader and Pabst raniked fourth; the Xesulting merger
produced 23.95 percent of the market. In the tr-state geographic market, Blatz ranked
sixth, with 5.84 percent, and Pabst was seventh with 5.48 percent. The national market
was marked by a rapid concentrating trend. The Court found that the merger would be
anticompetitive in all three areas. In reaching this decision the Court held that it was im-
material whether the concentrating trend was due to mergers or not. While Pabst involved
such a trend, it is significant to note that the percentage shares of the merging parties
in all three geographic areas were smaller than the resulting share in Stanley.
S0 377 U.S. 271 (1963). While the acquired firm's share was only 1.3 percent, the Court
stressed the fact that "no more than a dozen companies could account for as much as
1%." Id. at 281. In Stanley, no more than ten firms could account for as much as 1 percent.
31 In Alcoa, the Court pointed to the legislative intent as preventing those small
"accretions of power which 'are individually so minute as to make it difficult to use the
Sherman Act test against them.'" 377 U.S. at 280, quoting S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. 5 (1950). For a lucid and pointed example of the consequences of waiting for con-
centration to continue to the extreme, see the Appendix to Justice Douglas' concurring
opinion in United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 US. 546, 553-55 (1966).
32 While there are no presumptions per se, the government has issued these guide-
lines:
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However, the Second Circuit did not indulge in this per se ap-
proach. Instead, the court reached the conclusion that the combination
of Stanley's 1 percent with Amerock's 22-24 percent was in fact anti-
competitive.3 3 When a market is controlled by so few sellers, the shares
of each take on added significance.34 In Stanley, only nine firms could
account for over a million dollars in sales. As the tenth ranking firm,
Market Highly Concentrated
In a market in which the shares of the four largest firms amount to approximately
75% or more, the Department will ordinarily challenge mergers between firms
accounting for, approximately, the following percentages of the market:
Acquiring Firm Acquired Firm
4% 4% or more
10% 2% or more
15% or more 1% or more
Market Less Highly Concentrated
In a market in which the shares of the four largest firms amount to less than ap-
proximately 75%, the Department will ordinarily challenge mergers between
firms accounting for, approximately, the following percentages of the market:
Acquiring Firm Acquired Firm
5% 5% or more
10% 4% or more
15% 3% or more
20% 2% or more
25% or more 1% or more
The Department applies an additional, stricter standard in determining whether
to challenge mergers occurring in any market, not wholly unconcentrated, in which
there is a significant trend toward increased concentration.
Justice Dep't Merger Guidelines, I TRADE REG. REP. 4510, at 6884. Professor Bok would
prohibit any merger where the dominant firm in the industry increased its share by more
than 2-3 percent. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Econom-
ics, 74 HARv. L. RKv. 226, 308-29 (1960). Another authority would prohibit any acquisition
by a firm controlling 50-40 percent of the market. Darnell, Bank Holding Companies and
Competition: The First National Bancorporation Case, 89 BANKING I.J. 291, 315 (1972).
Professor Stigler suggests: "Every merger by a firm which possesses one-fifth or more of
an industry's output after the merger shall be presumed to violate the statute." Stigler,
Mergers and Preventive Antitrust Policy, 104 U. PA. L. Rav. 176, 182 (1955) (footnotes
omitted). Professors Kaysen and Turner also suggest such a standard:
Any acquisition of a competitor by a firm with 20 percent or more of its market
is prima facie illegal. . . . Any merger of competitors who together constitute
20 percent or more of a market is prima facie illegal.
ANrrnusr POLICY, supra note 12, at 133. See also Brodley, Oligopoly Power Under the
Sherman and Clayton Acts - From Economic Theory to Legal Policy, 19 STAN. L. R v. 285,
346-66 (1967); Markham, supra note 4, at 521-22. But cf. United States v. Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 564 (1963). The Court, while not adopting or rejecting these pre-
sumptive suggestions, stated "[w]ithout attempting to specify the smallest market share
which would still be considered to threaten undue concentration, we are clear that 30%
presents that threat." Id. More importantly, the Court would not allow a negative inference
should the percentages fall below thirty. Id.
33 469 F.2d at 508. The very fact that a 1 percent share is among the top ten in an
industry of fifty firms indicates that the bulk of the market is controlled by few, and there-
fore the small, but significant in terms of competitive position, require closer scrutiny.
34 469 F.2d at 507. The court found much support for this in United States v. Alumi-
num Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964). Alcoa had sought to acquire Rome, a competitor
having 1.3 percent of the market, ranking ninth. The Supreme Court invalidated the pro-
posed merger concluding that a substantial lessening of competition would result. Id. at 280.
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therefore, Stanley was the leader of the smaller firms and its merger
would have a substantial effect on the competitive structure.
Judge Kaunfman next turned to the decision by Stanley not to enter
the market de novo but instead to seek a merger. This analysis involved
two aspects, viz., the effect on the level of competition and the fore-
closure of future deconcentration. Belying his express intention to
review solely on the theory of actual injury, Judge Kaufman lapsed into
an approach which considered the elements of both actual and potential
competitive injury, occasionally intertwined beyond distinction. His
opinion stressed the finding that Stanley's own records revealed that
Stanley viewed itself as having a significant competitive impact on the
market, specifically that its entry through merger would help raise
prices.3
5
Stanley's study of the merger route was precipitated by its compara-
tively sluggish growth in the market. It appeared that Stanley's hard-
ware division had considered the merger advisable initially, but
Amerock was not willing.3 6 Thereafter, other long range alternatives
were considered. These included efforts to increase new product manu-
facture, to further develop manpower and programs in cabinet hard-
ware, and to continue to explore the possibility of acquisitions.37
According to Stanley, its poor reputation, the cost of die-casting ma-
chinery, and its lack of know-how and of distributive channels made
expansion inadvisable.38 What matters principally is not whether Stan-
ley considered itself a potential entrant, but what those in the market
thought. 9 The mere anticipation of Stanley's entrance would deter
35 One document stated that a specific advantage of the merger would be that it "would
knock out a competitor." Stanley Works, t1970-1973 Transfer Binder] 3 TRADE REG. REP'.
19,646, at 21,694 (FTC 1971). Another report expressed the view that the merger by
Stanley would "contribute to a reversal in the downward trend in prices and profits." Id.
at 21,701 n.17. Despite Stanley's claims that the memoranda involved were not reflective
of "management" policies, the FTC concluded, not only that Stanley was aware of its own
competitive significance, but also that Stanley possessed an anticompetitive motive in
seeking the merger.
36 469 F.2d at 517-19.
37 Stanley Works, [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] 3 TRADE REG. REr. 19,646, at 21,696-
700 (FTC 1971).
38 469 F.2d at 518-19. In United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 616
(S.D.N.Y. 1958), the court said of such a situation:
It is undoubtedly easier and cheaper to acquire and develop existing plant
capacity than to build entirely anew. Each defendant in urging the merger takes
a dim view of its ability to undertake, on its own, a program to meet the existing
and anticipated ... [market demands].... The defendants' apprehensions, which,
of course, involve matters of business judgment and, in a sense, matters of prefer-
ence, are not persuasive...
39 See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973). "While such sub-
jective evidence is probative on the issue of potential entry, it is inherently unreliable and
must be used with great care." Id. at 548 (Marshall, J., concurring). See also 18 CATH. U.L.
REV. 219, 222 (1968).
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growth attempts by cabinet hardware producers. Accordingly, the court
rejected Stanley's argument that the merger would have no impact on
the market structure. Judge Kaufman concluded that to permit this
merger would tip the lethargic competitive structure into rigidity and
further concentrate a lifeless oligopolistic market.40
Even if there had been no evidence of Stanley's intention to enter
the market de novo, it would have been necessary to determine whether
Stanley exerted a significant pro-competitive influence by remaining in
the wings. The FTC did not elaborate on this aspect of its potential
competition case, but rather found that it was reasonably probable that
Stanley may have entered the market sometime in the future, and conse-
quently its loss as a potential competitor itself was sufficient to result
in anticompetitive consequences. 41 The significance of the periphery
factor was recently expressed by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Falstaff Brewing Corp.42 Therein, the Court stated that "the fact that
Falstaff and its management had no intent to enter de novo, and would
not have done so, does not ipso facto dispose of the potential competition
issue."43 Moreover, the concurring opinion of Justice Marshall suggests
that "even if a firm at the fringe of the market exerts no present procom-
petitive effect, its entry by acquisition may end for all time the promise
of more effective competition at some future date." 44 The incipiency
40 469 F.2d at 505. Cf. United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973).
Although Falstaff was a potential competition case, it is significant here because the Court
explicitly left open the "question of the applicability of § 7 to a merger that will leave
competition in the marketplace exactly as it was, neither hurt nor helped," although a firm
merged rather than entered de novo. Id. at 537. Applying this rationale to Stanley, several
conclusions can be reached. Presumably, even if no discernible harm could be found from
Stanley's merger, there is still an "open question" whether it would have avoided violation
of the Clayton Act.
41 Stanley Works, 11970-1973 Transfer Binder] 3 TRAmn REG. REP. 19,646 (FTC 1971).
42 410 U.S. 526 (1973).
48 Id. at 533.
44 Id. at 561 (Marshall, J., concurring).
Professor Turner has suggested three minimum conditions for a finding that a firm is
"at the edge":
1) The market concerned must be an oligopoly market: the number of actual
sellers must be sufficiently small for them to be able collectively, though not neces-
sarily collusively, to maintain prices above competitive levels.
2The merging firm at the edge of the market must be recognized by those in
e market as the most likely entrant or one of a very few likely entrants, with
barriers to entry by new companies or by other established firms being significantly
higher.
3) The barrier to entry by the firm in question must not be so high that the price
it must expect to obtain before it would come in is above the price that would
maximize the profits of the existing sellers.
Turner, supra note 4 at 1362-65. Turner suggests even a stricter test if the only anticom-
petitive effect the government asserts is the elimination of a potential entrant. In those
instances he goes beyond a reasonable likelihood of entry and urges that there "be clear
proof that the firm would in fact have entered." Id. at 1384 (emphasis added). Cf. United
States v. First Nat'l Bancorporation, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 1003 (D. Colo. 1971), aff'd by an
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standard requires an examination of the peripheral effects of the merger.
Although this bespeaks a consideration of the lessening of potential
competition, the court maintained that the basis of its decision was the
lessening of actual competition. The majority did not deal with the
Chenery problems this might raise, but justified its position by pointing
to the concentration within the market. Relying on Supreme Court
dictum, 45 the Second Circuit held "that the industry is sufficiently con-
centrated to invoke the proscriptive sanction of the Clayton Act under
the circumstances of this case." 46 Thus, Stanley's loss through merger
was determined to be harmful for two reasons: first, it eliminated a
small, but significant competitor in a concentrated industry; secondly,
it added to the share of the dominant firm, thereby increasing market
concentration and foreclosing eventual deconcentration.
Judge Mansfield vigorously dissented. Primarily, he felt that the
court's consideration of the merits of the "actual theory" was a blatant
violation of Chenery.47 Furthermore, in the merits of neither the actual
nor potential theories could he find a substantial anticompetitive ef-
fect.4 8 Emphasizing the lack of any concentrating trend and looking
beyond the parties' stipulations to the actual competitive overlap, he
found that the actual loss in competition was .35 percent, 49 de minimis
for a violation.50
equally divided Court, 410 U.S. 577 (1973) (per curiam), discussed in Darnell, Bank Holding
Companies and Competition: The First National Bancorporation Case, 89 BANKING L.J.
291 (1972).
45 469 F.2d at 504. Judge Kaufman quoted the opinion of Mr. Justice White in United
States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 461-62 (1964):
[W]here there has been a 'history of tendency toward concentration in the industry'
tendencies toward further concentration 'are to be curbed in their incipiency.'
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. at 345, 346, 82 S. Ct. [1502] at 1535.
Where 'concentration is already great, the importance of preventing even slight
increases in concentration and so preserving the possibility of eventual deconcen-
tration is correspondingly great.' United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374
U.S. 321, 365 n.42....
46 469 F.2d at 504.
47 Judge Mansfield recognized that the Commission had "alluded" to the actual om-
petition, but believed that "the real basis of its decision was its finding of foreclosure of
potential competition." 469 F.2d at 510.
4s Id. at 509.
49 Id. at 513.
50 Had there been no stipulations this viewpoint might have succeeded. Judge Mans-
field points out that a breakdown suggests an actual competitive overlap of $248,000,
which on a nationwide scale is significantly smaller than previous decisions have found for
a violation. But the parties did stipulate figures of $814,000 for Stanley, and $18,000,000
for Amerock; and they did stipulate that these were in one market. As Judge Kaufman
aptly noted, "No statistical legerdemain justifies disregarding the binding stipulation that
controls this case ... " 469 F.2d at 506. However, the dissent does suggest a line of inquiry
which appears meritorious, viz., what dollar figure would be a bar to a finding of substan-
tiality? While it is true that the figure will never be viewed in a vacuum, but in relation
to the competitiveness of the industry, there remains the question of how much weight
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Turning to the potential competition allegation, Judge Mansfield
found an even weaker argument. Although the Commission had relied
heavily upon documents from Stanley as indicative of managerial intent
to expand or merge into the market,5 ' Judge Mansfield concluded that
many of these memoranda were from the lower level officers of Stanley,
and the ultimate decision against de novo entry had been made by the
corporate managers. 52 Moreover, Judge Mansfield pointed out, there
was not a recognizable peripheral influence being exerted by Stanley.53
The dissent suggested that the majority had in fact seized upon the
FTC's mention of actual competition because the case against Stanley
on potential competition grounds was obviously inadequate.54
Notwithstanding the tenuous application of Chenery to the FTC's
decision, 55 Stanley represents an attempt by the Second Circuit to imbue
section 7 of the Clayton Act with added vitality. Relying on the concepts
of substantiality and incipiency, the court held that it is no longer
necessary to find a trend toward increased concentration when the
market structure is already concentrated. By invalidating the merger
between Stanley and Amerock the Second Circuit followed the admo-
nition expressed by District Judge Weber in United States v. Brown
Shoe Co.:
We can only eat an apple a bite at a time. The end result of con-
sumption is the same whether it be done by quarters, halves, three-
quarters, or the whole, and is finally determined by our own appe-
tites. A nibbler can soon consume the whole with a bite here and a
bite there. So, whether we nibble delicately, or gobble ravenously,
the end result is, or can be, the same.56
In recognizing the dangers of the step by step concentration process,
the Second Circuit concluded that, in a concentrated market, the in-
dustry leader may well find that "little bite" is forbidden fruit.
should the dollar foreclosure be given. The focus of the courts and the authorities, see
note 12 supra, has been traditionally on the percentage share foreclosed, but the cases
frequently resort to the magnitude of the dollar volumes to bolster this. Would the Com-
mission in Stanley have proceeded if at least this figure were not substantial? Cf. Tampa
Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961) (though a section 3 case, the Court
found a $128,000,000 exclusive contract to be only .77 percent of the market and conse-
quently insubstantial).
51 See note 35 supra.
52 469 F.2d at 517-19.
53 Id. at 519.
541d. at 510.
55 See notes 14-24 supra.
56 179 F. Supp. 721, 740 (E.D. Mo. 1959).
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